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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
OGDEN STANDARD EXAMINER and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

.
..
..
.
..
.
.
.
.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and LESLIE SKELTON and
T. R. CHENEY, co-conservators :
for the dependent children of :
.
CLIFFORD CHENEY, deceased,
Defendants.

Case No. 18311

..

.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS

NATURE OF THE CASE
A petition for writ of review was filed by the plaintiffs
Ogden Standard Examiner and the State Insurance Fund to review
an order of the Industrial Commission holding them liable for
compensation benefits to the dependents of Clifford P. Cheney.
DISPOSITION BY THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
A hearing was held June 5, 1981 before Administrative Law
Judge Joseph Foley on the application of the conservators of the
minor children of Clifford Cheney for workmen's compensation
benefits.

The employer of the deceased and its insurance car-

rier denied liability for his death on the ground that it did
not arise out of or in the course of his employment.

On

November 25, 1981 the Administrative Law Judge entered his findSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ings of fact, conclusions of law and order holding the plaintiffs liable to the dependents of the deceased for compensation
benefits.

A timely motion for review was filed by the plain-

tiffs pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
amended.

(1953) Sec. 35-1-82.53, as

On February 19, 1982 the Industrial Commission, through

two of its members, entered an order denying the plaintiffs'
motion for review and adopting the findings and conclusions of
the Administrative Law Judge.

The third member of the Commis-

sion filed a dissenting opinion expressing his conclusion that
Mr. Cheney's death did not arise out of or in the course of his
employment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs respectfully request that the court reverse the
order of the Industrial Commission holding them liable for workmen's compensation benefits as a result of the death of Clifford
Cheney.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the time of his death on Saturday March 22, 1980,
Clifford Cheney was the Managing Editor of the Ogden Standard
Examiner.

He had served in that capacity for nine months.

(R 180)

As managing editor, it was his responsibility to supervise
those in the editorial department in the preparation of the news
and editorial content of the newspaper.

He had never personally

covered any news event for the paper or written a story on a
news event himself.

He had no public relations duties, and other

employees were assigned that function.

(R

278-279, 284)

Mr. Cheney died in an automobile accident which occurred in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the early morning hours on Highway 89 near Layton, Utah, as
he was returning to his home in Ogden from Salt Lake City.
Mr. Cheney was driving his own car when he apparently lost control on the slick road and was struck by an oncoming truck.
His wife, the only passenger in the car, was also killed.

{R 3-5)

Mr. and Mrs. Cheney had spent Friday evening in the company
of Mrs. Wilda Gene Hatch, president of the Standard Corporation
(which does business as the Ogden Standard Examiner) , her husband George Hatch, their son Randall Hatch and his wife.

They

had attended the annual Governor's Ball together and socialized
at the home of the Hatches before and after the event.
Mr. George Hatch testified at the hearing in this matter
that prior to the evening in question he acquired two tickets
to the Governor's Ball by virtue of his membership in the "Century
Club," an organization of contributors to the Democratic Party.
Upon learning that several other members of the Century Club
who worked in companies affiliated with the Standard Corporation
had also acquired tickets, he reserved a table at the event for
himself and Mrs. Hatch and six others.

(R

259)

Each ticket holder

purchased his own membership in the club, and none were purchased
by the Hatches or by the Standard Corporation.

(R

259)

Later, several of those for whom Mr. Hatch had reserved
seats decided not to attend, and they made their tickets available
to him.

(R

259,265)

He discussed with his wife who they thought

might enjoy attending the ball.

It appeared originally that

only one pair of tickets was available, and the Hatches invited
their son and daughter-in-law to use them.

When it developed that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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they would be given others, they decided to invite the Cheneys.
(R

240-241)
Mrs. Hatch testified that on Monday or Tuesday of the week

of the ball she met Mr. Cheney in the hall at the office of the
Standard Examiner.
Governor's Ball.
(241)

She asked him if he had ever attended the
He said that "he had always wanted to go."

She told him that she might have some extra tickets and

would let him know later.

(R

241)

On Wednesday afternoon Mrs.

Hatch told Mr. Cheney that she would, in fact, have extra tickets,
that her son and daughter-in-law were attending, and asked whether
he would like to attend.

He told her that he would discuss it

with his wife and would let her know.

(R

242)

The following day, either by phone or at the newspaper office, Mr. Cheney accepted Mrs. Hatch's invitation.

He stated that

he would drive down to Salt Lake from Ogden rather than ride with
Randall Hatch, and Mrs. Hatch invited him to come to their home
before the ball.

She testified that she invited them because

she thought the Cheneys might enjoy a social evening with them.
(R

242-243)
Mr. and Mrs. Cheney arrived at the home of the Hatches at

approximately 6:15 Friday evening, and spent an hour there before
leaving for the Salt Palace.

Cocktails were served and Mr. and

Mrs. Hatch, their son and daughter-in-law, and the Cheneys talked
about their families, about traveling and camping in Utah, and
about how the Cheneys liked living in Ogden.

They admired the

Hatch's collection of Indian artifacts and travel mementos and
toured the house.

There was no discussion about newspaper busi-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ness.

(R 243-244, 261, 274)
At approximately 7:15 p.m. the group drove together in Mr.

George Hatch's car to the Salt Palace.

They sat at the table

which had been reserved and spent the evening discussing the
upcoming election campaign, as well as other topics about which
they had been conversing previously, and meeting elected officials and others who came by their table.

Mr. and Mrs. Cheney

danced one dance, and the group left by 11:30 p.rn.

There was

no discussion of the business of the Standard Examiner.
The city editor of the newspaper assigned a reporter, Flora
Ogan, to cover the event as its press representative.

She at-

tended the ball and wrote the story about it which appeared the
following day.

(R 290-291)

The Cheneys returned to the Hatch's home after leaving the
Salt Palace.

Mr. Hatch served Mr. Cheney another drink and they

talked about the ball.

Randall Hatch discussed with his wife

whether she wanted to spend the night in Salt Lake, and the
Cheneys offered to give Randall a ride home.

Randall and his

wife decided to return to Ogden in their car, however, and the
Cheneys left Mrs. Hatch's home at about 12:30 a.m.
not conducted or discussed.

(R

Business was

246-247, 261-263, 276)

Testimony was presented at the hearing in this matter concerning the nature and purpose of the Governor's Ball, which is
held annually to raise money for the Governor's political party.
(R

6-25)

Mr. Cheney's brother-in-law and sister-in-law and two

co-workers also testified concerning statements he made to them
about his intention to discuss business during his evening with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Mr. and Mrs. Hatch.
POINT 1
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF
FACT DO NOT SUPPORT ITS LEGAL CONCLUSION
THAT CLIFFORD CHENEY'S DEATH AROSE OUT
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.
This Court has held many times that in reviewing an order
of the Industrial Commission

it will examine the findings of

fact made by the Commission in light of the issue of law raised
by a claim for benefits to·determine whether an award is supported by those findings, Jones v. Industrial Commission, 90 Utah
121, 61 P.2d 10 (1936), and further, that it will review the
evidence insofar as necessary to determine whether there is substantial, competent evidence upon which to support an award.
Tintic Standard Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 100 Utah
96, 110 P.2d 367 (1941); Savage v. Industrial Commission, 565
P.2d 782 (Utah 1977).

The plaintiffs respectfully submit that

the findings of fact made by the Commission do not support its
conclusion that Clifford Cheney's death arose out of or in the
course of his employment within the meaning of the Utah Workmen's
Compensation Act.
Utah Code Ann.

(1953) Sec. 35-1-45 provides that the depen-

dents of an employee "who is killed by accident arising out of
or in the course of his employment" are entitled to workmens'
compensation benefits.

Construing Section 45 of the Compensation

Act, this Court has held that an accident arises out of or in the
course of employment if it occurs while an employee is performing
his assigned duties, or is doing " . . . things which it should
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reasonably be expected an employee would do in connection with
those duties."

United States Steel Corp. v. Draper, 613 P.2d

508, 509 (Utah 1980).

In the case of Askren v. Industrial Com-

mission, 15 Utah 2d 275, 391 P.2d 302, 304 the court stated that
[t]he essential thing is that there be
some substantial relationship between
the activity engaged in and the carrying on of the employer's business.
More precisely, this court has held that the phrase "arising out of" as used in Section 45 refers to the origin or cause
of an injury, and that the phrase "in the course of" refers to
the time, place and circumstances of an injury.

Utah Apex Min-

ing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 537, 248 P.2d 490 (1926).
The court stated that,
An injury which occurs in the cours~
of the employment will ordinarily, but
not necessarily, arise out of it, while
an injury arising out of an employment
almost necessarily occurs in the course
of it.
248 P.2d at 413.
In the case of an employee whose place and hours of work
are fixed, it is usually not difficult to ascertain whether an
accident arises out of or in the course of his employment.

When

an injury occurs to an employee whose place and time of work are
flexible, more difficult questions may be presented, just as the
issue may be closer when an employee who is injured outside the
ordinary place or hours of employment claims that some special
nexus between his employment and the after hours, off premises
injury brings it within the scope of the Compensation Act.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

Professor Arthur Larson,

(hereinafter referred to as

"Larson"), in his treatise, Workmen's Compensation Law, examines a variety of circumstances where injuries to workers
may present difficult questions of compensability, including
injuries which arise out of an employee's attendance at a social
event.

Summarizing the law of American jurisdictions generally,

Larson states that
Recreational or social activities are
within the course of employment when
(1) They occur on the premises during
a lunch or recreation period as a regular
incident of the employment; or
(2) The employer, by expressly or impliedly requiring participation, or by
making the activity part of the services
of an employee, brings the activity within the orbit of the employment; or
(3) The employer derives substantial
direct benefit from the activity beyond
the intangible value of improvement in
employee health and morale that is common to all kinds of recreation and social
life.
Larson, supra, Vol. lA, Sec. 22 p. 5-71.
The case at bar does not concern an accident on an employer's premises, and Larson's analysis is useful in this instance
in its second

an~

third facets.

With reference to the second

basis for bringing a social activity within the course of a
worker's employment Larson states that,
The distinctive feature of this test is
that it turns on what the employer himself does.
Lqrson, supra, Vol. lA, Sec. 22.2 at p. 5-78.
Larson examines a range of conduct on the part of an employer

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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which might bring social or recreational activity within the
course of employment by him.

If an employer makes attendance

at social affairs a part of an employee's job description, or
if an employer actually requires an employee's attendance at a
given event, its relation to the course of his employment is
clear.

When the employer's involvement with the social event

is less, the question is closer, however.
When the degree of employer involvement
descends from compulsion to mere sponsorship or encouragement, the questions become closer, and it becomes necessary to
consult a series of tests bearing on workconnection. The most prolific illustrations of this problem are company picnics
and office parties. Among the questions
to be asked are:
Did the employer in fact
sponsor the event? To what extent was attendance really voluntary? Was there some
degree of encouragement to attend in such
factors as taking a record of attendance,
paying for the time spent, requiring the
employee to work if he did not attend, or
maintaining a known custom of attending?
Did the employer finance the occasion to
a substantial extent? Did the employees
regard it as an employment benefit to which
they were entitled as of right? Did the
employer benefit from the event, not merely
in a vague way through better morale and
good will, but through such tangible advantages as having an opportunity to make
speeches and awards?
lA Larson, supra, Sec. 22.23, p. 5-85.
When the degree of employee involvement in sponsoring or
promoting an event is minimal, courts may, in Larson's view, properly inquire whether the employer derived sufficient direct
benefit from an employee's attendance to make it effectively a
service to his employer.

As examples of such benefits,Larson

cites cases where compensation was awarded because of the enSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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hancement of sales which a businessmen's entertainment of custamers is expected to produce, the advertising benefit which
may result from a company softball team, or the opportunity of
which an employer may avail himself at a social event to present
awards or make speeches.

lA Larson, supra, 22.30.

Larson emphasizes, however, that less tangible benefits
to an employer from an employee's social activities

such as

improved relations, better morale, or increased efficiency have
been found insufficient to bring an activity within the coverage
of compensation acts.

The problem, Larson notes,

is not that such benefits do not result,
but that they result from every game the
employee plays whether connected with his
work or not. . .

*

*

*

And so, just as in the sleeping and eating
cases some arbitrary time and space limitations must circumscribe the area within
which the "benefit" establishes work-connection, the recreation cases must submit
to some similar limitation, since otherwise there is no stopping point which can
be defined short of complete coverage of
all employee's refreshing social and recreational activities.
It can be taken
as the majority view that these morale and
efficiency benefits are not alone enough
to bring recreation within the course of
employment.
lA Larson, supra, Sec. 22.30 at Pp. 5-116-117.
'Ibis Court has not had occasion to adopt expressly the
Larson test of the compensability of accidents which arise out
of participation in a social event.

The Court has, however,

relied on Professor Larson's analysis of other course of employment issues as with injuries arising out of horseplay,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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e.g., Prows v. Industrial C"ommission, 610 P.2d 1362 (1980).
Furthermore, a review of Utah decisions discloses a strict adherence to the principle that the course of employment includes
only those activities in which an employee is reasonably required to engage in the performance of

~is

duties, and which

directly and tangibly benefit his employer.
In the case of Lundberg v. Cream O'Weber Dairy Farms, 24
Utah 2d 16, 465 P.2d 175 (197oi the Industrial Commission denied
benefits to the widow of a sales manager who died in an automobile
accident while driving home from a special sales meeting held
before normal working hours.

The court affirmed the denial,

holding that the case fell within the rule that an employee is
not acting in the course of his employment when he drives to or
from work.
It is true that the statute does not require that a compensable accident be at any
particular place and that Workmen's Compensation coverage has been approved in certain cases even though the employee had not
arrived at the place of employment.

*

*

*

Notwithstanding what has be·en said in
those cases, it is fundamental that even
though the employee may not be at a regular
place of work, he must be performing a duty
for his employer, or one which is so connected with his employment as to be an essential part thereof, so that the mandate of
the statute is met that there must be an
"accident arising out of or in the course
of employment." (emphasis supplied)
465 P.2d at 176.
It was noted that the general rule in Utah and in other
jurisdictions is that injuries sustained while an employee is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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going to or corning from work are not compensable.

See also:

Barney v. I'ndustrial Commission, 29 U.2d 179, 506 P.2d 1271
(1973); Roberts v. Industrial Commission, 87 Utah 10, 47 P.2d
1052 (1935).

Exceptions to the general rule have been allowed

when an employer furnishes transportation to and from work, or
when a route which is an employee's sole access to his place of
work contains a hazard that is peculiar to that route, e.g.
Cudahay Packing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 161, 207
Pac. 148 (1922).

The applicant relied instead on another ex-

ception, contending that her husband was engaged in a "special
mission" for his employer
sales meeting.

when he drove to the early morning

Similarly, Professor Larson notes that when ac-

cidents which occur while driving to or from a social event are
found to be compensable it is because the social event itself
is found to be one which the usual test brings within the course
of employment, so that the trip to attend it is a "special rnission. "lA Larson, supra, Sec. 22.23 p. 5-100, note 70.
This Court has analyzed "special mission" claims by the
same criteria which apply to other course of employment
issues.

In the case of Wilson v. Industrial Commission, 116 Utah

46, 207 P.2d 1116 (1949), the court reversed an award of benefits
to dependents of an employee who was killed on a trip from his
home in Salt Lake City to a shop in Magna to repair a car for his
employer, a used car dealer and auto repairman.

The applicants

contended that the deceased had been sent specially to Magna to
perform that task.

The employer contended that he had not dir-

ected the deceased to make a special trip for that purpose but
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had merely informed him that he would be required to make the
repairs after he arrived at work.

The court stated the basis

of its holding as follows:
The employer's instructions in this instance merely directed the decedent as to
what he should do after arriving at his
place of employment. The instructions
given did not send the deceased upon a
special errand but merely outlined what
would be expected of him in performing
his duties the next day.
207 P.2d at 1119.
In Wilson, as in other cases construing the "special mission", or "special errand" rule, the test applied is whether
or not the employee was instructed to make the trip which resulted in his death, or whether the trip was one otherwise part

-

of the employee's duties.

The case of Board of Education v. Industrial Commission,
102 Utah 504, 132 P. 2d 381 (1942), involved a physical education
instructor employed by the Logan City Board of Education.

The

instructor was required as a condition of his employment to serve
as a member of the Logan City Recreational Council which was a
joint enterprise between the school ·district and the city.

Be-

cause of his expertise on the subject, the instructor was asked
to give an address about public recreation to the Lions Club in
Brigham City.

He was injured in an automobile accident returning

to Logan.
The Supreme Court reversed the Industrial Commission's award
of benefits to the applicant on the ground that there was insufficient competent evidence that a speech such as he had made
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in Brigham City was part of his required duties as an employee
of the Board of Education.

The Court found no evidence that his

employer had required the applicant to make the speech or that
the employer benefited from any service rendered there.
The case of Auerbach Co. v. Industrial Commission, 113 Utah
347, 195 P.2d 245 (1948), concerned an automobile accident which
arose out of a recreational event.

A department store cashier

was injured while driving to a basketball game in which she was
to play on a team sponsored by her employer.

Despite the fact

that gas for her travel was purchased by the company, and that
the public relations officer for Auerbach's was in charge of the
team, the Industrial Commission's award of benefits to her was
reversed by the Supreme Court.

The Court held that since the

applicant was not hired and compensated to play sports for her
employer, and since her participation on the company team was
entirely voluntary, her accident did not arise out of her employment.

The concurring Justices noted that although the employer

obviously derived some advertising benefit from the team it did
not render the injured worker's travel to the sporting event
part of her employment.
The case of Martinson v. W-M Insurance Agency, 606 P.2d 256
(Utah 1980),arose from an injury sustained by an insurance executive in an automobile accident while returning to his home in
Salt Lake City from a social function in Park City he claimed
to have attended for business reasons.

The applicant's company

insured the Kimball Art Center and he drove to Park City to attend its grand opening.

He

st~yed

over night with the director
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of the center who was a friend and former employer.
Affirming the Industrial Commission's denial of benefits,
the Supreme Court stated that
To maintain actuarial soundness and integrity of workmen's compensation systems,
it is essential that premiums be collected
to cover the risks involved. The coverage
does not, and as a practical matter, cannot
extend to any injury done to an employee
wherever and whenever it happens but is
limited to accidental injuries which occur
in the course of or arise out of the performance of his duties.

*

*

*

Reverting to the issue in this case in
the light of what has just been said:
the
problem presented to the Commission was
whether the plaintiff was actually and
basically involved in the performance of his
duties, or was mainly involved in a social
situation with his friend and former employer, and then after he became involved in the
accident, claims that he was engaged primarily in a business situation.
In justification of its _conclusion, the
Commission noted certain significant facts:
that except for his own testimony as to the
desirability of doing so, there was no evidence that the plaintiff was directed or required by his employer to go to Park City on
the insurance business; and that under the
facts shown, there is no reason to believe
that anything that needed to be done about
increased insurance could not have been
done without anyone leaving the Salt Lake
Office.
Consequently, it recited that upon
its consideration of the whole evidence, its
conclusion was that the plaintiff's trip
was primarily social and not within the
course of his employment. (emphasis supplied)
606 P.2d at 257-258.
Again in the Martinson case, the absence of sufficient
evidence that the injured employee was directed to attend an
event or that any substantial business was conducted there reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sulted in a ruling that he had failed to sustain his burden of
proving his injury was related to his employment.
The plaintiffs respectfully submit that in order to affirm
an award of compensation benefits for the death of an employee
in an automobile accident while returning from a social event,
this court must determine that the Industrial Commission has
made findings supported by competent evidence that are suff icient under the principles announced in prior Utah decisions to
establish its cornpensability.

At the very least, the Commission's

findings must be consistent with Larson's analysis of claims
arising out of social events; it must be found that the injured
employee was expressly or impliedly required to attend the event
or that his attendance there was of such a direct and substantial
benefit to his employer that it could fairly be said to be within
the scope of his services to his employer.
Turning to the findings of fact made by the Industrial
Commission through the initial order of the Administrative Law
Judge and in the order denying the plaintiffs' motion for review,
it is clear that they do not support the conclusion that Clifford
Cheney's death arose out of or in the course of his employment.
In his order awarding benefits the Administrative Law Judge
lists as findings of fact in addition to those which were stipulated by the parties, that is, the occurrrence of the accident
and the dependency of the children of the deceased, the following:
(1)

the deceased was invited to attend the

Governor's Ball by Mrs. Hatch;

(R. 331)
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(2) the deceased regarded his invitation as
an opportunity to persuade Mrs. Hatch to
publish a particular article and to discuss
editorial policy;

(R

332)

(3) the deceased did not have an opportunity
to have the discussion with Mrs. Hatch he
intended;
(4) the deceased was amply prepared to discuss
work related matters had the opportunity presented itself.
In denying the plaintiffs' motion for review the two member
majority of the Industrial Commission cited the following findings in support of their affirmance of the Administrative Law
Judge's

order~

(5) the deceased attended the function with a
business purpose in mind;
(6) the invitation to attend by the employer
brought the activity within the scope of his
employment;
(7) the Ball was considered a business-linked
event by many and the deceased attended the
ball with the intent of acting as a representative of the Ogden Standard Examiner.
It is immediately apparent when the Commission's findings
of fact are compared with the requirements for compensability of
an accident under Utah law that the findings do not support the
award made.
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The Commission found that the deceased was "invited" by
the president of the corporation which employed him to attend
the Governor's Ball.

It did not find that he was required either

directly or indirectly to attend.

The Canmission found that no busi-

ness was discussed at the event but that the deceased attended
with the intention of discussing business or otherwise "representing" his business.

However, the Commission did not find

that the employer of the deceased actually benefited by his attendance through his performance of any business function, or
through his presence in some capacity as a representative of the
Standard Examiner.
The Industrial Commission's conclusions of law in this case
stand in marked contrast to the decisions of this court in claims
arising out of accidents which occurred as an employee was returning from an event away from the employer's premises.

In each

such case, this court has required a finding that the employee
was actually engaging in a service to his employer at the time
he was injured.
By finding simply what was conceded by all that the deceased
was "invited" to attend the Governor's Ball, the Commission has
concluded in effect that he was not "compelled" to attend.

By

finding that no business was discussed during the evening of

Mr. Cheney's death, that he intended to do so but did not have
the opportunity, the Commission has effectively found that no
busniess purpose was served by his attendance at the ball and
visit to the Hatch's home.
The only legal conclusion which can be drawn from the CornSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mission's own findings of fact is that the death of Clifford
Cheney did not arise out of or in the course of his employment
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann.

(1953) Sec. 35-1-45 and

the Commission's order should therefore be reversed.
POINT II
THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT THE
DECEASED'S DEATH AROSE OUT OF HIS
EMPLOYMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBST~..NTIAL EVIDENCE.
Apart from a consideration of whether the Commission's
findings of fact support its award, this court has jurisdiction
on review to examine the record to determine whether there is
substantial competent evidence to support the conclusion of
the Industrial Commission that the accident in issue is compensable.

The plaintiffs submit that there is no evidence in the

record upon which the Commission could have made findings which
would support the award.
Turning first to the question whether the deceased was
expressly or impliedly required to visit Mrs. Hatch's home and
attend the Governor's Ball, a test which focuses, as Larson noted,
"on what the employer himself does,"lA Larson, supra, Sec. 22.2
at p. 5-78, the evidence is not in conflict.
Mrs. Hatch's testimony about her own conduct 1s, 1n its
entirety, as follows:

Q.

Tell me how you came to invite Mr. Cheney,

then.
A.

Well, I said, "Have you ever been to a

Governor's Ball?" knowing that while he lived
up in Logan, they hadn't been in Salt Lake that
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much.

And he said, "No, I've always wanted to

go, but it was always too expensive."

Q.

Where did this conversation take place?

A.

Oh, I think in the hall, one of the hall-

ways to the Standard.

Q.

Do you remember what day of the ueek?

A.

I think it was Monday or Tuesday.

Q.

Monday or Tuesday of the week--

A.

The week of the ball.

Q.

To your recollection the conversation was

in the hallway?
A.

Uh huh.

And so I said, "Well, I may have

some extra tickets, but I'll have to let you
know."

And so that was the end of that conver-

sation.

Q.

When did you next converse with him about

the invitation?
A.

It was about Wednesday.

Q.

What occurred?

A.

Wednesday afternoon.

I said:

"I will have

some extra tickets, and if you would like to come
down to the ball with your wife that would be fine.
My son is coming, and you could drive down with
them."
Q.

Where did you see Mr. Cheney on Wednesday?

A.

I think he came in to my office to ask me

something about the editorial department.
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Q.

Did he accept the invitation?

A.

He said he would talk to his wife and see

what they had planned and let me know.
Q.

When did you next converse about the invita-

tion?
A.

I don't know whether he called or whether

it was the next time I was up at the paper.
I really can't recall.

He--

He did indicate, whichever

way it was, from a phone call or I ran into him
at the paper, that they would like to come.
at that time I said:
fancy.

And

"Well, you know, it's not

It's held in the Salt Palace, which is

kind of barny, and they don't have a big fanfare
like they used to.

And so you don't have to wear

a tux, and you wife can wear a short dress.

It's

not just a dressy affair any more."
And so then I said, "How do you want to come?"
And he said, "We'll drive our own car."
And so I said, "That's fine."

And I told him

the time to come and to come by our house in Salt
Lake ahead of the ball.
Q.

What was your purpose in inviting Mr. and Mrs.

Cheney to take those extra tickets to the ball?
A.

I just thought that he might enjoy doing some-

thing social with us.
for quite a long time.

I had been friends with Cliff
I knew him when he was up in

Logan, not well, but I had seen him at various conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-21-

ferences and Sigma Delta Chi meetings.

And I

thought he would enjoy having a social evening,
and especially since my son was coming down that
they could get acquainted.
his wife.
(R

And I had never met

That occasion didn't often occur.

241-243)
The relevant ipquiry in reviewing the evidence is whether

it could support a finding that (a) Mrs. Hatch either expressly
or impliedly compelled Mr. Cheney to accept her invitation or
(b) whether by her conduct or that of other supervisors, Mr.
Cheney's attendance at the social event was made part of the
services he was expected to render to the newspaper.
Courts have generally agreed with Professor Larson that
compulsion to attend a social event may be indirect and subtle
and yet still sufficiently forceful to make such an activity
a requirement of employment.
annotation at 47 ALR3d

See, e.g., cases cited in an

566, "Workmen's Compensation:

Injury

Sustained While Attending Employer-Sponsored Social Affair."
However, none of the factors which are generally relied on as
evidence of indirect compulsion and were discussed earlier, are
present in the case at bar.
Considering these factors individually, the evidence is
undisputed that (1) the Governor's Ball was not a social event
sponsored by the Ogden Standard Examiner;
tendance was not specifically required;

(2) Mr. Cheney's at-

(3) there is no evidence

of any known custom of managing editors of the newspaper attending the function;

(4) tickets to the event were not purchased
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or paid for by the employer;

(5) no claim was made that atten-

dance at the ball was an employee benefit to which Mr. Cheney
was entitled.
The defendant may speculate as his counsel did in argument
before the Commission that the disparity in age and in relative
position at the newspaper made a social invitation from Mrs.
Hatch to Mr. Cheney inherently compulsory.

However, there is

no evidence whatsoever from which the inference of compulsion
to attend can be drawn.

The tone of the interchange between

Mrs. Hatch and Mr. Cheney, the fact that she asked him whether
he would like to attend, that he stated he had always wanted to
but

had found it too expensive, and his response that he needed

to check his plans with his wife, all suggest the voluntariness
of the choice Mr. Cheney was given to attend.
The record is devoid of evidence of any other conduct on
the part of supervisory personnel which would make attendance at
the ball a required service of his employment.
It was the testimony of Mr. Cheney's immediate supervisor,
Jay Banks, General Manager of the Standard_Examiner, that Mr.
Cheney's position as managing editor included no duty to act
as a public relations representative of the newspaper (R 284)
and a reporter was assigned by the city editor to cover the
event as a news story.

(R

291)

His successor, Mr. Randall Hatch,

testified that public relations activities are entirely inconsistent with the detachment and impartiality required of one who
manages the news and editorial department.

The Industrial Com-

rnission' s finding that the deceased attended the Governor's Ball
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"with the intent of advancing the interests of his employer by
acting as a representative of the business at the event"

(R

351)

may or may not be a justifiable finding as to the state of mind
of the deceased, but is not even remotely based upon any evidence of conduct of the employer which would make his attendance
at the ball an act in furtherance of public relations duties, or
an act of representation of the newspaper in any capacity.

As noted, even in the absence of conduct on the part of the
employer which makes attendance at a social event a specific requirement of his employment, it may still be found to arise out of
a worker's employment according to Professor Larson if there is
evidence that the employer derived substantial direct benefit to
his business from the activity engaged in.

The applicant in this

case did not contend that any business was conducted or discussed
during the evening Mr. Cheney spent in the company of the Hatches.
Mr. and Mrs. Hatch and their son Randall Hatch each testified
that the group conversed during the evening exclusively about
matters unrelated to the newspaper.

(R. 246-247, 261-263, 276)

Although counsel for the applicant argued before the Commission that Mr. Cheney's presence at the Governor's Ball may
have benefited the public relations of the newspaper, no evidence
to that effect was introduced.

The applicant did present the

testimony of a former Democratic Party official and a former
aid to the Governor concerning the nature and purpose of the
Governor's Ball.

Both testified that it is held primarily to

raise money for the Democratic Party.

(R.

157, 169)

Both were also

asked to state their opinions about "why people attend the Governor's Ball."

Counsel for the plaintiffs objected to this testi-
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mony on the ground that no foundation was laid for their expression
of opinions about the motives of other people who attended the
Governor's Ball and that such opinions bore no relevance to the
decisions of the parties in this case.

(R 159-161, 171)

Mr.

Briggs was permitted to testify, however, that some people attended the ball as an expression of support for the Democratic
Party (R 163), some people attended because of the entertainment
and social aspects of the function,

(R 162) and some people

attended because of the "kind of interaction which took place
there."

(R 164)

Mrs. Wilde testified that many people attend

the ball to support the Democratic Party but that business and
industrial leaders commonly attend because of a "subtle belief
that it opens doors for them."

(R 172)

Even if it were proper to receive the evidence from these
officials about why people attend the Governor's Ball, it provides no support for any finding about what benefit to its business the Standard Examiner derived from Clifford Cheney's presence
there.

One could only speculate about the good will for the news-

paper that might have been generated by the attendance of anyone
in the Hatch's group, but no evidence of such a benefit can be
found in the record.
The jist of the applicant's case, and the expressed basis
for the Industrial Commission's award, was the evidence produced
by the testimony of two co-workers of the deceased and of his
brother-in-law and sister-in-law that Mr. Cheney's purpose in
attending the ball was to discuss with Mrs. Hatch a series of
articles he wanted published which she had apparently rejected,
and to otherwise increase his influence over her in matters of
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editorial policy.
Plaintiffs objected to the introduction of extensive hearsay evidence about statements made by the deceased concerning
his motivation for accepting Mrs. Hatch's invitation, and the
basis of this objection is the subject of later discussion.
Assuming for the purpose of argument, however, that all the hearsay testimony about Mr. Cheney's motives is competent evidence
upon which to make a finding in this case, and assuming further
that his primary purpose in attending the ball was to discuss
business and heighten his influence in newspaper policy decisions,
the plaintiffs submit that such evidence still fails to establish
that Mr. Cheney's death arose out of or in the course of his employrnent.
Though the Industrial Commission does not clearly articulate
it, the legal view it expresses is that an accident which occurs
when an employee is returning from an off-premises after-hours
social event is compensable if the employee attended it with the
intention of conducting or discussing business when he arrived,
even if no business is actually conducted or discussed.l
1 The Administrative Law Judge made the following remarks in his
discussion of the evidence:
No business was discussed by the parties
at the ball. Being the guests of the Hatches,
the tone of the conversation of the evening
was more or less set by them notwithstanding
the fact that Mr. Cheney was prepared to discuss the Freeman Institute article or other
business related matters.
He did not get the
chance to do so, and as a guest of the Hatchs
it appears he did not feel it in good taste
to bring the matters up unless the opportunity
was presented by Mr. or Mrs. Hatch. (R 332)
This explanation for the fact that those gathered did not discuss
business is completely speculative and without the sliahtest eviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Industrial Commission's construction of Section 45 of
the Compensation Act is directly contrary to the holdings of
this court.

In each of the Utah decisions discussed earlier, it

will be noted that the Court's determination of whether or not
an accident arose out of or in the course of employment was based
on an objective standard.
In the Auerbach and the Logan Board of Education cases, discussed earlier, the inquiry was the same; was this trip one which
the applicant or deceased's employer specifically required him
to make, was it otherwise part of the duties he was hired and
assigned to perform, or was it of such benefit to the employer
that it could fairly be said to be in fulfillment of a service
to the employer.

In neither of these cases nor in other Utah

decisions on the subject was the motive or belief of the employee
about the nature of the trip considered sufficient evidence in
itself to bring such a trip within the course of his employment.
The defendant argued before the Commission that because the
deceased was a managerial employee with flexible working hours
his intention to conduct business during a social evening, even
if not carried out, made his trip to attend the ball a job assignment.

This court's opinion in Martinson, supra, belies such a

view of the course of a managerial employee's employment.

In

considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support the Commission's finding that the applicant's trip to Park City had
been a social one and not in furtherance of his business, the
court defined the Commission's task to be a determination of
whether the employee "was actually and basically 'involved in
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the performance of his duties or was mainly involved in a
social situation • . . "

Martirtson, supra, 606 P.2d at 257.

The necessary evidence which this court said was lacking for a
finding of compensability was evidence that the applicant had
been "directed or required to go to Park City on insurance business" or had actually conducted business.

Martinson, supra, 606

P.2d at 258.
The subjective intent of a white collar, managerial employee in attending a social event is not more dispositive of the
issue of cornpensability than are the motives of other workers in
attending such events.

Mr. Cheney was not self-employed; he was

subject to the direction and control of his immediate supervisor,
Mr. Banks, and ultimately of the Standard Corporation of which
Mrs. Hatch is president.

If, through them, his employer did not

make attendance at the Governor's Ball a part of his job duties,
if they did not direct him to attend, and if his presence did
not further the business interests of the newspaper in a tangible
way, the activity was not part of the course of his employment
under Utah law.

An award of compensation benefits which is

founded solely upon evidence that Mr. Cheney told several people
he intended to discuss business during his evening with the
Hatches is necessarily the result of a misapplication of Section
45 of the Act.
The Industrial Commission's misconstruction of the law is
one which would have an onerous effect on workmen's compensation
in this state if affirmed.

This court has taken a strict view of

the compensability of injuries which are suffered by ''blue collar
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workers," that is, people who work for wages during specified
hours at a specified place.

If such a worker claims that he was

injured after hours and outside his employer's premises, he must
produce clear evidence under Utah law that he was engaging in a
service to his employer at the time.

This strict view is war-

ranted by the Act itself which is intended to compensate workers
for injuries arising out of the hazards of their jobs, and not
as a general accident insurance policy.
If the Commission's decision becomes the law of this jurisdiction, a strikingly difficult standard of compensability would
apply to managerial workers who can always assert that the broad
nature of their responsibilities makes all kinds of activities
outside the office a service to their employer.

If a mere in-

tention to discuss business at a social activity is sufficient
to make the trip to and from that event part of his employment,
the average white collar worker could bring nearly every lunch
time excursion or afternoon golf game within the course of his
employment.

No one could suggest that when a factory worker

stops after work for a refreshment with co-workers, even if he
was invited by his foreman, that an accident on his way home
arose out of his employment.
at the same time that

~Then

It would be grossly unfair to hold

a manager accepts an invitation from a

supervisor to attend a prestigous social event, his own intention
to discuss bnsiness with his supervisor, even when not effectuated,
makes his attendance there an incident of his employment.
The Industrial Commission's award of benefits in this case
is based upon an erroneous construction of the Compensation Act
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and sould be reversed.
POINT III
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S AWARD
IS BASED ON INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE.
The Commission majority summarized the evidence which it
found sufficient to sustain the award made in this matter by
stating that (1) the deceased attended the Governor's Ball with
a business purpose in mind, and (2) the event was considered
primarily as a "business linked event."

Both of these findings

rest, however, on incompetent evidence.
(a) Hearsay Evidence.

This Court has held that, for the

limited purpose of assisting the Commission in interpreting and
understanding competent, material evidence, it may receive otherwise inadmissable hearsay testimony.

Columbia Steel v. Industrial

Commission, 92 Utah 72, 66 P.2d 124 (1937); Ogden Iron Works v.
Industrial Commission, 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376 (1942).

It

has consistently been heid however, that
since the action of the Commission results in a determination of the substantial
rights of the parties, this Court has long
been committed to the position that there
must be a residuum of evidence, legal and
competent in a court of law, to support a
claim before an award can be made, and a
finding cannot be based wholly on hearsay
evidence.
132 P.2d at 379.
This Court quite recently reaffirmed its prior holding that
in an administrative proceeding such as the Public Service Cornmission or the Industrial Commission,
a finding of fact cannot be based solely
on hearsay evidence, but must be supported
by a residium of legal evidence competent
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in a court of law.
Sandy Sta·te Bank v. W. S. Brimhall, 636 P.2d

481 (Utah

1981).
The Administrative Law Judge received extensive testimony
from two reporters who worked under Mr. Cheney's supervision and
from his brother-in-law and sister-in-law about his plans to
spend the evening with Mr. and Mrs. Hatch.

Specifically, Vaugn

Roche testified that the afternoon of the Governor's Ball, Mr.
Cheney told him he was attending "because management wanted him
to."

(R 187)

John Harrington testified that Mr. Cheney told him

on the same day that he would

"have a chance to really do a sales

job on the [Freeman Institute] story" at the ball.

(R

137)

Mrs.

Pamela Skelton testified concerning conversations withMr. Cheney's
wife about why it was important to Mr. Cheney's business position
that they attend the ball rather than spend the evening with their
family.

(R 213-217)

Mr. Steven Skelton testified that on the day

before the ball, Mr. Cheney told him that he looked forward to it
as an opportunity to talk with Mrs. Hatch about newspaper philosophy and improve his understanding of her position on matters of
policy.

(R 228)

This testimony was the subject of a continuing

objection by counsel for the plaintiffs.

(R 186-187, 213, 216)

In order to determine whether this evidence is competent to
support the Industrial Commission's findings, the question whether
it is admissible under any exception to the hearsay rule must be
considered.

Inasmuch as it was introduced in order to establish

the deceased's intention to discuss business at the Governor's
Ball, Rule 63(12) of the Utah Rules of Evidence might be suggested
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as a basis for receiving it.

This exception to the hearsay

rule provides in pertinent part as follows:
Statements of Physical or Mental Condition
of Declarant. Unless the judge finds it was
made in bad faith, a statement of the declarant' s (a) then existing state of mind, emotion
or physical sensation, including statements of
intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling,
pain and bodily health, but not including
memory or belief to prove the fact remembered
or believed, when such a mental or physical
condition is in issue or-is relevant to prove
or explain acts or conduct of the declarant. . .
(emphasis supplied)
The distinctive feature of the "state of mind" exception to
the hearsay rule is that it arises only when hearsay statements
about the declarant's state of mind are relevant to explain his
own acts or conduct.

Such statements are, therefore, inadmissible

to prove or explain the acts or conduct of someone other than the
declarant, and are inadmissible when the state of mind of the declarant in performing certain acts is not in issue.
Construing the rule in the case of State v. Wauneka, 560
P.2d 1377 (Utah 1977),this Court reversed the conviction of a
defendant who was found guilty of manslaughter for the death of
his wife.

The trial court had received evidence of statements

made by the deceased victim shortly before her death that the defendant would kill her if she left him or called the police.
Holding the admission of such testimony to be both erroneous and
prejudicial the court stated that,
The statement made by the deceased that
Ben would kill her if she called the police or left him may well be proof of her
then state of mind and of her mental feeling; but her then mental condition is not
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an issue in this trial, nor is it relevant
to prove or explain her subsequent acts or
conduct.
560 P.2d at 1379.

(A thorough exposition of the antecedents

and current application of this exception to the hearsay rule
in both civil and criminal context is found in an article at
1977 Utah Law Review No. 1, p. 85 "Relative Relevance --

A

Limitation on the Use of State of Mind Testimony in Homocide
Prosecutions"}
Reviewing the hearsay evidence upon which the Commission
relied in making its findings, it is apparent first that the
testimony of Vaugn Roche that Mr. Cheney told him he was attending the Governor's Ball "because management wanted him to" is
inadmissible under this exception to prove anything about what
Mrs. Hatch or other management personnel wanted or said or did.
It is equally obvious that the lengthy testimony concerning Mrs.
Cheney's statements of why she felt it was important that they
accept Mrs. Hatch's invitation, or what her husband had said to
her on the subject, are not admissible under this exception since
her state of mind and her conduct are in no way relevant to the
findings the Commission was required to make.
The question presented then, is whether the remainder of
the hearsay evidence of Mr. Cheney's statements about his plans
to discuss employment related subjects during his evening with
the Hatches is admissible under the state of mind exception to
the hearsay rule.
By the express terms of the rule, such evidence is admissible
only if the plans of the deceased to discuss subjects which were
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notactually discussed are relevant in themselves or relevant
to explain his conduct during the evening.

However, under Utah

law, as it has been noted, the issues in a case such as this
are (a) whether Mr. Cheney was expressly or impliedly required
by his employer to attend the Governor's Ball, or whether his
supervisors otherwise by their conduct made his attendance part
of his duties and (b) whether the Ogden Standard Examiner derived a substantial and tangible benefit to its business by
Mr. Cheney's attendance at the ball.

Mr. Cheney's statements

about what he intended to do are simply not relevant, as the
plaintiffs have contended here earlier, to either issue and
therefore are not admissbile under the state of mind exception
to the hearsay rule.
According to the decisions of this court, the hearsay evidence upon which the Commission relied cannot be the basis of
the factual findings it made.
(b) Opinion Evidence.

The only other evidence upon which the

Commission relied in making its award was the testimony of Mr.
Briggs and Mrs. Wilde about why people attend the Governor's
Ball.

Though, as noted earlier, their opinions differed, and

though they both acknowledged that some people's reasons for attending differed from others, the Commission relied on this evidence in finding that the ball was a "business-linked" event and
that the deceased's presence there was business related.
Evidence in the form of a witness's opinion is admissible
under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Evidence in certain circumstances.
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RULE 56

TESTIMONY IN FORM OF OPINION
(1)
If the witness is not testifying as an
expert his testimony in the form of opinions
or inferences is limited to such opinions or
inferences as the judge finds (a) may be rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) are helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or to the determination of the fact in issue.
(2)
If the witness is testifying as an expert, testimony of the witness in the form
of opinions or inferences is limited to such
opinions as the judge finds are (a) based on
facts or data perceived by or personally
known or made known to the witness at the
hearing and (b) within the scope of the
special knowledge, skill, experience or
training possessed by the witness.
The pertinent testimony from Mr. Briggs concerning his knowledge of the reasons people attend the Governor's Ball is as follows:

Q.

Are these kinds of people you've been de-

scribing the kinds that generally attend the ball?
A.

Yes, they would attend the ball.

Q.

Do you know why--I'm not asking specifically

do you know why generally they attend the ball?
(Objection and discussion omitted)

*
Q.

(By Mr. Low)

*

*

All you can do is answer yes,

because that was the question, yes or no.

Now, what

background or information do you have that would lead
you to that opinion?
A.

Well, my experience as an executive director.

Q.

As an experienced executive director, do you

have contact with the people you invite to the ball?
A.

Yes.
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Q.

Has that been over a period of several years?

A.

Two years.

Particularly the two years, that

was one of my chief responsibilities, yes.

Q.

Do you in that position have personal contact

with these people?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Have you ever discussed with people who are

invited to the ball why they attend?
A.

No.

(emphasis supplied)

*
Q.

(By Mr. Low)

*

*

My question is this, Kent.

On

what do you base this opinion that you have that you
know why people attend the ball?
A.

Experience.

Q.

I'd like you to tell us what experience.

A.

All right.

social event.

The ball, first of all, is a fine

The Utah Sumphony played while I was there.

The RDT did a little stint.
dancing, good food.

It was something that was--

There was also a-- the chance for

people who worked, knew each other, to see each other and
talk.

I's a social event as well as a fund-raising ac-

tivity; but the primary responsibility of the ball was to
raise money.

I mean, you didn't do it just to bring

people together.

It was a way of funding the opera-

tions of the Democratic Party.
(R

160-162)
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Mrs. Wilde's testimony about her own expertise in assessing
the motives of those who attend the Governor's Ball was comparable.
She discussed her planning functions as an assistant to the
Governor but testified as to no specific facts from which their
state of mind could be inferred.
Mr. Briggs and Mrs. Wilde's opinion testimony, whether they
are considered lay witnesses or experts on the subject of the
Governor's Ball,was improperly received.

In either event, they

are properly limited under the Rule to opinions which are based
upon their own perceptions or facts known to them.

They did not

testify about having spoken to anyone concerning their reasons
for attending the Governor's Ball, and testified as to no other
facts from which they could made a reasonable inference about
the state of mind of people generally who attended the Governor's
Ball.
Furthermore, no theory was advanced by the defendant and
none is apparent, of the relevance of this testimony to the issues
before the Commission.

If the pertinent questions to be resolved

concerned the nature 9f Mrs. Hatch's invitation to Mr. Cheney
and the relation of their activity during the evening to their
business, evidence about the motives of people generally in attending the event is simply not probative.
Opinion evidence is not admissible when the trier of fact is
capable of drawing his own inferences and conclusions from the
facts presented.

Yowell v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 100 Utah

120, 110 P.2d 566 (1941); Sturgis v. Garett, 85 Idaho 364, 379
P.2d 658 (1963).

A witness may not offer a conclusion which is
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founded upon surmise and hearsay rather than testifying as to
facts, and their reasonable inferences.
110 Utah 222, 171 P.2d 392 (1949).

Hansen v. Hansen,

And, even when a witness is

permitted to repeat a conversation he had had with another he may
not express his opinion as to the state of mind of the declarant.
Kimball Elevator Co. v. Elevator Supplies Co., 2 Utah2d 289, 272
P.2d 583 (1954).
An expert witness may give his opinion about a matter which
involves some aspect of trade or learning not within the general
knowledge of the trier of fact.Webb v. Olin Matheson Chemical
Corp., 9 Utah2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094 (1959).

Thus, it may have

been permissible to allow Mr. Briggs and Mrs. Wilde to testify
about the nature and purpose of the Governor's Ball if some basis
qf its relevance were established.

However, nothing in their

credentials or experience qualified them as experts in assessing
the state of mind of people generally who attend the event, and
their opinions on the subject were inadmissible conclusions based
on unfounded speculation.
Thus, the two findings of fact which the Commission expressly
relied on in making its award, that the deceased intended to discuss business at the ball, and that many people attend the ball
for business reasons, are founded entirely upon incompetent evidence which cannot support the conclusion that the deceased's
death arose out of or in the course of his employment.
CONCLUSION
The accident which took Clifford Cheney's life was a terrible
and tragic occurrence.

However, the law does not impose upon the
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j

employers' of this state the obligation to insure their employees
or their dependents against any injury they suffer, but only to
compensate them for accidents which arise out of or in the
course of their employment.

When an employee has an accident

while discharging his duties or engaging in activities reasonably
incidental to his duties,his accident is compensable.

When a

worker dies in an automobile accident while returning to his home
from a public social event outside his employer's premises, his
death is not compensable absent proof that he was specially required to attend it or was otherwise engaged in service to his
employer at the time.

This court has consistently reversed

awards of the Commission where the findings or the evidence did
not support such a conclusion.

....
In the case at bar the Industrial Commission found that
Clifford Cheney was invited by the president of the corporation
which employed him to attend a public social event and to visit
her home.

It found that he intended to discuss business with her

during the evening but did not.

These findings do not support

the legal conclusion that his death en route to his home at
the end of the evening was reasonably related to his duties as
managing editor of the Standard Examiner.

Furthermore, there is

no evidence upon which the Industrial Commission could base findings which would support an award since the undisputed testimony
was that the deceased was not required to attend the Governor's
Ball and engaged in no service to his employer during the evening.
To affirm the order of the Industrial Commission, this Court
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tion Act that renders all after hours social intercha~ge between people who work together a part of their employment for
the purpose of workmen's compensation.

Such a construction of

the law is directly contrary to this Court's prior application of
the Act and completely inconsistent with its purpose.

The plain-

tiffs respectfully request that the Industrial Commission's
order be reversed.
DATED this

Jriv day

of June, 1982.

ROBERT D. Ml§ORE
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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